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HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY
I. INTRODUCTION
The homosexual in the armed services presents, at the least, a unique situa-
tion. In the past armies have actively tried to assimilate this group with varying
success.' The attitude of the United States military toward the homosexual be-
gan to receive concerted study during World War II, when investigations were
made of the applications of the well-known "section VIII"2 discharge, which
provided prompt separation from service for those exhibiting various types of
deviant behavior, under the heading: "Inaptness or Undesirable Habits or
Traits of Character. '"3
Then, as today,4 cases involving enlisted men were handled primarily through
administrative procedures other than courts-martial, except when the offense
was aggravated.5 All cases of deviant behavior were processed before a board of
three officers. When possible, one of these would be a medical officer, and a psy-
chiatrist's report was utilized in lieu of testimony as to his examination of the
accused and his findings. 6 Special courts-martial rules of procedure governed
during board hearings, but counsel was not authorized. T
If the board decided that discharge was the appropriate remedy, the discharge
could be either "White" (with honor) or "Blue" (without honor).8 Discharge
under section VIII was usually White, because "the conduct of the enlisted man
during his current period of service has been such as would render his retention
in the service desirable were it not for his inaptitude or lack of required adapta-
bility for military service." 9 If the accused, however, had evinced psychopathic
behavior, chronic alcoholism, or sexual perversion including homosexuality, he
1. Plato, The Symposium 48 (Penguin ed. W. Hamilton transl. 1951).
2. AR 615-360, Section VIII, 26 Nov. 1942 [hereinafter cited as Section VIII].
3. Id. West & Glass, Sexual Behavior and the Military Law, in Sexual Behavior and the
Law 250, 251 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as West & Glass]. See generally
McNiece & Thornton, Military Law from Pearl Harbor to Korea, 22 Fordham L. Rev. 155
(1953).
4. Everhard, Problems Involving The Disposition of Homosexuals In The Service, 2
JAG Bull. No. 6 at 20, 21 (U.SA.F. Nov. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Everhard].
5. West & Glass at 251. See also Section VIII, fI 51(c).
6. "Whenever available, a trained psychiatric examiner, or officer possessing such ex-
perience, will be called as a witness in the case and present his testimony to the board."
Section VIII, U 51(c). See Clackum v. United States, 296 F.2d 226, 228 (Ct. Cl. 1960) for a
psychiatrist's finding' of "'sexual deviate manifested by homosexuality latent," based on a
half-hour interview.
7. Section VII, U 51(d)(1).
8. West & Glass at 252.
9. Section VIII, U 55(b). The provision is somewhat similar in effect to the current
AR 635-200, 15 July 1966, which provides that the type and character of separation issued
upon administrative separation from current enlistment or period of service is to be deter-
mined solely by the member's military record, including behavior, during that enlistment or
period of service.
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received a Blue certificate. 10 Whether the certificate was White or Blue the dis-
charge would contain a reference to section VIII as the reason for the dis-
charge." The explicit reason for the separation would not be noted. A Blue
discharge only indicated that the exhibited maladjustment was more severe
from a moral standpoint.1 2 Officers falling within the proscriptions of section
VIII were similarly dealt with either by courts-martial or appropriate adminis-
trative procedure.' 3
A study14 of ineffective soldiers found that homosexuals separated during
World War II were usually given Blue discharges since "[w]hatever the root
of their aberrant behavior, the Army found them guilty of serious breaches of
discipline and since they were mentally responsible for their actions, they were
punished-at least to the extent of being discharged without honor."'0 They
were discharged as soon as possible after their aberrant behavior was brought
to the attention of a responsible officer.' 6 The study argued that the Blue dis-
charge was often a benefit to the soldier in question since, if he had been charged
before a court-martial, conviction would be almost certain, with the resulting
loss of suffrage and the probability of a prison term.17
The Surgeon General's office conducted several studies during the War. In
1943 for example, the Army processed 20,620 "constitutional psychopaths" of
whom 1,625 were presumably of the "homosexual type."' 8 A National Research
Council report followed 183 known homosexuals and found that 51 were re-
jected at induction (but only 29 of these for neuro-psychiatric reasons); 14
were prematurely discharged from service for various reasons; and 118 served
from one to five years (58o as officers), concealed their homosexuality effec-
tively, and had good records.19
Policies toward the homosexual became more liberal toward the end of the
War, primarily through the efforts of the Surgeon General's Office.20 Regula-
10. West & Glass at 252.
11. "'Section VIII, AR 615-360; not eligible for reenlistment or induction.'" Section
VIII, ff 54(a). In all papers other than the discharge certificate the actual cause of dis-
charge was given, with reference to the appropriate regulation. Id. U 54(b).
12. West & Glass at 252.
13. Id.
14. 1 E. Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier: The Lost Divisions (1959).
15. Id. at 92-93.
16. Id. at 93.
17. Id.
18. West & Glass at 252. William Menninger questioned the significance of these figures
on the grounds that for every homosexual discovered by the Medical Department 5 or 10
were never detected. W. Menninger, Psychiatry in a Troubled World 225 (1948). Kinsey
attributed the low figures to the announcement at the beginning of the war of the official
policy of exclusion of homosexuals, who were thus induced to conceal their tendencies. 58
Sci. News Letter, July 1, 1950, at 5.
19. West & Glass at 252.
20. Id. at 253.
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tions related to the separation from service of the homosexual were directed to be
applied only to those who were "apprehended or were reported to have per-
formed homosexual acts.... ."2 Soldiers who merely sought advice or treatment
from a psychiatrist or doctor were excluded. 22 Certain persons considered "re-
claimable" were provided hospitalization.2 Six months after these directives
were promulgated, section VIII was superseded.24 Aberrant behavior remained
a cause for discharge, but deviant sexual behavior was specifically referred to
as: "psychopathic personality manifested by antisocial or amoral trends, crimi-
nalism, chronic alcoholism, drug addiction, pathological lying, or sexual mis-
conduct in the service .... "25 The type of discharge to be given was still not
specified, but the form of discharge certificate was Blue.2 0
Further liberalizations in Army policy developed following the War. Enlisted
men who were found to be inadaptable because of homosexual tendencies re-
ceived an Honorable Discharge if they had committed no sexual offense while
in the service and if their record of service otherwise justified an Honorable
Discharge.2 7 Officers were permitted to resign under the same conditions.a
21. Id. True or confirmed homosexual officers could resign for the good of the service;
enlisted men were processed under section VIII and given a Blue discharge; either officers
or enlisted men could demand a court-martial. War Dep't Circular No. 3, §§ 2(a)(I)-(3)
(3 Jan. 1944).
22. West & Glass at 253.
23. Id. These were usually first offenders, those under undue influence, especially by a
person of superior age or grade, and those acting as a result of intoxication, immaturity,
use of drugs, or curiosity. The confirmed homosexual would probably not have been con-
sidered "reclaimable" considering military attitudes and facilities for treatment, since a cure
usually requires "psychiatric-psychoanalytic treatment of one to two years' duration, with
a minimum of three appointments each week-provided the patient really wishes to change."
E. Bergler, Homosexuality: Disease or Way of Life? 188 (1956) (emphasis deleted).
24. AR 615-368, 20 July 1944, as revised 7 March 1945. This regulation also superseded
those sections of War Dep't Circular No. 3, supra note 21, which pertained to enlisted men.
The three-officer board was retained, one being a medical officer, and psychiatric testimony
was required.
25. AR 615-368, 7 March 1945, 3 I(a) (2).
26. Id. % 5. West & Glass noted that the Surgeon General's office tried to change this
practice but failed since, "'[ult was apparently feared that many homosexuals who were
well adjusted would seek to be discharged and that others might claim to be homosexual
for the purpose of getting out of the Army with honorable discharges." West & Glass at
254. The authors argue that the belief that non-homosexuals would feign homosexuality is
fallacious, pointing out the possibility of more socially acceptable forms of simulation of
cause for discharge, such as physical illness. Id.
27. West & Glass at 254-55. As before, the enlisted man could not be separated on the
sole basis of a confession of homosexuality; "adequate evidence of psychological maladjust-
ment due to homosexual tendencies which rendered the individual inadaptable for service"
was sufficient. Id. See AR 615-368, 10 April 1945, 2Y.
28. West & Glass at 255.
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H.-- DEVELOPMENT OF CURENT REGULATIONS
Military attitudes toward the homosexual began to shift after 1947 as the
lenient applications of the rather liberal rules and regulations gave way to much
stricter procedures.2 9 The new Department of Defense issued a directive to be
applied uniformly by all services "in all cases involving homosexual tendencies
or acts."130 A Department policy statement recited that "known homosexual
individuals were military liabilities and security risks who must be eliminated."0 1
As this policy became effective in the early 1950's, three "classes" of homo-
sexuals were defined in military regulations.3 2 A Class I homosexual is a per-
son who, while under military jurisdiction, has engaged in a homosexual act
involving force, fraud, intimidation, or a minor.3 Class I homosexuals are sub-
ject to a general court-martial, and are usually sentenced to fines, imprison-
ment, and punitive discharges, either Dishonorable or Bad Conduct. 84 A Class
II homosexual is a person who, while in the service, has wilfully engaged in one
or more homosexual acts, or has proposed or attempted to do so under condi-
tions not involving force, fraud, intimidation, or minors. Such a person usually
29. Id.
30. Id. at 256.
31. Id. West & Glass argue that the new policy was attributable at least in part to the
Senate investigations on homosexuals in government. See Senate Comm. on Expenditures
in the Executive Departments, Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in
Government, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); SECNAV Instruction
1900.9(4) (a), 20 April 1964.
32. See AR 635-89, 15 July 1966; AFR 35-66, 17 March 1959; AF Man. 39-12, 1
September 1966; SECNAV Instruction 1900.9, 20 April 1964.
33. Military law defines a minor as a person under 16. E.g., SECNAV Instruction
1900.9(6) (b) (2), (c) (1).
34. West & Glass at 256-57. Army regulations, which parallel those of the other services,
provide the following types of separation: Honorable Discharge under AR 635-200, 15 July
1966 (enlisted men) and AR 635-5, 23 January 1967 (officers), given for the convenience
of the government, expiration of enlistment, minority, resignation, dependency or hardship,
disability, revocation or termination of appointment, or discharge to accept appointment;
General Discharge under AR 635-200, 15 July 1966 (enlisted men) and AR 635-5, 23 January
1967 (officers), given for the convenience of the government, disability, disloyalty or sub-
version, expiration of enlistment, minority, resignation-unsuitability, and homoseiality;
Undesirable Discharge under AR 635-200, 15 July 1966 (enlisted men), given for misconduct,
homosexuality, qualified resignation-unfitness, disloyalty, subversion, absence without leave,
or desertion; Discharge (under other than honorable conditions) under AR 635-5, 23 January
1967 (officers), given for conviction of a felony by civil authorities or a security viola-
tion; Bad Conduct Discharge, ordered by general or special courts-martial; Dishonorable
Discharge ordered by general courts-martial. Officers found to be homosexuals may resign
for the good of the service in lieu of court-martial under AR 635-89, 15 July 1966. Note that
Honorable, General and Undesirable discharges may be given by administrative procedures.
Dismissal is an appropriate sentence only for an officer, and is equivalent to a Dishonorable
Discharge. Bednar, Discharge and Dismissal as Punishment in the Armed Forces, 16 Military
L. Rev. 1, 34 (1962) (hereinafter cited as Bednar]; see M. Edwards & C. Decker, The
Serviceman and the Law 43 (1951).
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receives an Undesirable Discharge, with the reason for discharge incorporated
by reference on the certificate to the appropriate regulation.a Most current
cases are Class II.*a A Class III case is a person who exhibits, professes, or ad-
mits to homosexual tendencies, or habitually associates with per-ons known to
him to be homosexuals, but who has not, so far as is known, engaged in a homo-
sexual act, or attempted or proposed to another to do so either while in the
service or before his induction. Current regulations mandate an Honorable or
General Discharge in Class III cases.
A study3 7 of 201 soldiers investigated for homosexuality found that 74.69o
received Undesirable Discharges, 16.4%o were retained in the service, 5% re-
ceived General Discharges, 1.5% resigned (these were all officers), and 2.5%6
received other discharges. Investigation of these cases through the Office of
Special Investigations from initiation until final disposition varied from one to
fifteen months, with an average period of five months.38
Retention in the service has been permitted by a series of modifications to
the regulations beginning in 1955.39 Problems involving disclosure of confiden-
tial interviews by psychiatrists and doctors were alleviated.40 In Class III cases
Honorable or General Discharges, depending on the character of the accused's
service, have been made mandatory.41
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF REGULATIONS AND ARTICLE 125, UCMNJ
Homosexuals who fall within Class I or Class II may also42 be subject to
courts-martial under article 125 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,43
35. See Army and Air Force Regulations, supra note 32; SECNAV Instruction 1900.9
(4) (b), 20 April 1964.
36. West & Glass at 257. Class H cases often accept the Undesirable Discharge through a
waiver of general court-martial charges. Id. at 258-59. Officers may resign for the good of
the service. Both officers and enlisted men who resign or accept an Undesirable Discharge
must sign a waiver recognizing that separation will be under conditions other than honorable,
that federal and state veterans' rights will be lost, and that they expect to find difficulty in
civilian life due to the character of their separation. E.g., SECNAV Instruction 1900.9(6) (c)
(2) (b) (1) (2), 20 April 1964.
37. Reported in West, Doidge & Wiliams, An Approach to the Problem of Homo-
sexuality in the Military Service, 115 Am. J. Psychiatry 392 (1958).
38. Id.
39. West & Glass at 258. But see, e.g., AR 635-89, 15 April 1955, as modified, 8 Sept.
1958, as further modified, 14 April 1959.
40. West & Glass at 258. But see Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969,
9 150(b), J 151(c)(2), which would suggest that the doctor-patient privilege is not as
stringent as during the post-war "liberal" period. See generally Uniform Code of Military
Justice, art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
41. West & Glass at 268-69; see, e.g., AR 635-200, 15 July 1966.
42. Some cases have gone so far as to report a stipulation that the accused under
UCMJ, art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1964), was a Class II homosexual. United States v.
Rivera, 12 U.S.C.T.A. 507, 31 C.M.R. 93 (1961); United States v. Sheehan, 29 C.M.R. 887
(1960).
43. UCMJ, art. 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1964). This article states: "Sodomy. (a) Any
1969]
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which condemns sodomy and bestiality. This article, however, has not served to
pre-empt administrative discharge procedures in many cases involving homo-
sexuals.44 Cases arising under this article and relevant regulations illustrate
the military procedures used in dealing with them. In addition to prosecution
under article 125, officers may also be subject to prosecution under article 134,
as in one Navy case. 45 There a commander was found not guilty of sodomy
but guilty of committing an indecent, lewd and lascivious act, and was dismissed
under article 13446 with forfeiture.47
In another case48 petitioner, charged with certain violations of articles 125
and 134, had not been permitted to submit a signed statement requesting an
Undesirable Discharge in lieu of undergoing court-martial, as permitted under
an Army regulation.49 On petitioner's habeas corpus request after conviction by
the court-martial, the court discussed Burns v. Wilson,"0 noting that it was
limited by that Supreme Court decision to examining whether the general
court-martial had jurisdiction, and whether all the contentions of petitioner
had been heard and considered fully and fairly by the military tribunals. The
petition was denied.
A rather interesting Air Force procedure was examined by the Court of Claims
person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another
person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration,
however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. (b) Any person found guilty of sodomy
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct." Id. See W. Aycock & S. Wurfel, Military
Law Under The Uniform Code of Military Justice (1955). See also United States v. Cook,
15 U.S.CM.A. 436, 35 C.M.R. 408 (1965); United States v. Bennington, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 565,
31 CM.R. 151 (1961).
44. West & Glass at 271; see Grant v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 600, 611 (1963). AFR
35-66, 17 March 1959, concerning Air Force discharge procedures for homosexuals, see text
accompanying note 32 supra, did "no more than set up an extraordinary procedure for the
administrative elimination of homosexual persons if resort to this method, rather than trial
by court-martial, is determined to be the preferred action by those empowered to make such
decision." United States v. Sheehan, 29 C.M.R. 887, 889 (1960).
45. Augenbick v. United States, 377 F.2d 586 (Ct. Cl. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S.
1038 (1968).
46. UCMJ, art. 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964). Note that "Eain officer who publicly
associates with known sexual deviates to the disgrace of the Armed Forces is guilty of an
offense against Article 133, UCMJ." Murphy, The Soldier's Right to a Private Life, 24
Military L. Rev. 97, 119 n.128 (1964); see United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.. 637, 26
C.M.R. 417 (1958).
47. "Forfeiture" means loss of pay and allowances. Augenblick v. United States, 377
F.2d 586, 607 (Ct. C1. 1967).
48. Bokoros v. Kearney, 144 F. Supp. 221 (ED. Tex. 1956).
49. AR 600-443, April 10, 1954. As a Class II homosexual, had petitioner been offered
an Undesirable Discharge and had he refused to accept it, he could have been given a Bad
Conduct Discharge after a court-martial. United States v. Betts, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 214, 30
C.M.R. 214 (1961).
50. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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in Clackunt v. United States.51 Petitioner, accused of homosexuality, had been
given an opportunity to resign.52 She refused and demanded trial by court-
martial. Charges were preferred against her but were not referred for investiga-
tion, as the court found was required by courts-martial statutes.5 3 Instead, she
was summarily discharged under an Air Force regulation 4 which provided that
if the evidence was so insubstantial that a conviction by court-martial would
be unlikely the executive officer of the Air Force could in effect convict the
person and impose a penalty, in this case a discharge under conditions other
than honorable with resulting loss of reputation, rights and benefits.5 5 Interest-
ingly, the charges and evidence, which included a psychiatric evaluation reflect-
ing "a diagnosis of sexual deviate manifested by homosexual latent,"503 based
on a half-hour interview, were revealed to the petitioner only after her dis-
charge. The government contended that this "remarkable arrangement," as the
court characterized it, was necessary "in the interest of an efficient military
establishment for our national defense.' 5 7 The court found that the "Air Force
had the undoubted right to discharge her whenever it pleased, for any reason
or for no reason, and by so doing preserve the Air Force from even the slightest
suspicion of harboring undesirable characters. But it is unthinkable that it
should have the raw power, without respect for even the most elementary notions
of due process of law, to load her down with penalties."5 8 The court further
found that "[t]he so-called 'hearing' before the Air Force Discharge Board
was not a hearing at all, in the usual sense of that word. It was a meaningless
formality, to comply with the regulations. 5 9 The court vacated the discharge
and awarded petitioner back pay.c0 In contrast, the same court in Grant v.
United States0 ' found that article 125 did not mandate a court-martial in every
51. 296 F.2d 226 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
52. See AFR 35-66(5) (b) (1), 17 March 1959.
53. 296 F.2d at 227.
54. AFR 35-66(5) (b) (1), 17 March 1959. The court noted that the regulation "is as if a
prosecuting attorney were authorized, in a case where he concluded that he didn't have
enough evidence to obtain a conviction in court, to himself impose the fine or imprisonment
which he thought the accused person deserved." 296 F.2d at 228.
55. See text accompanying notes 76-88 infra.
56. 296 F.2d at 228.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 296 F.2d at 229; see Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
In another case, failure to notify the accused of various procedural rights as required by
regulations was not sufficient to reverse the sodomy conviction of a Class II homosexual.
United States v. Sheehan, 12 U.S.C.MA. 507, 509, 29 CI.MR. 887, 889 (1960). See also
Note, Judicial Review of Discharge Classifications Determined in Military Administrative
Proceedings, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 533 (1957).
60. Back pay is commonly awarded in illegal discharge cases. See, e.g., Egan v. United
States, 158 F. Supp. 377 (Ct. CL 1958); Boruski v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 320 (Ct. CL
1957); Shapiro v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 205 (Ct. CL 1947).
61. 162 Ct. CL 600 (1963).
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case of sodomy, and that the Navy was not precluded from discharging peti-
tioner through administrative procedures. 62
IV. PUNISHMENT THROUGH DISCHARGE
The Class II homosexual is usually given an Undesirable Discharge. 8 There
has been much discussion about the punitive nature of this type of discharge. 6 '
The court in Grant, while upholding petitioner's General Discharge, argued
that "[o]nly a court-martial can impose a punitive discharge . . . ."0 One
writer noted that "there are only three forms of discharge recognized as punitive
(dismissal [Officers], dishonorable and bad conduct) ... ."GO On the other hand,
since approximately 90% of all discharges issued are honorable, there is truth
in the statement "anything less than an honorable discharge is viewed as
derogatory, and inevitably stigmatizes the recipient."6 7 The inevitable loss to
reputation caused by a discharge less than honorable may make it difficult for
the recipient to find civilian employment.68 The recipient of an Undesirable
Discharge also faces losing valuable post-separation benefits, such as pay for
accrued leave6 9 and burial in a national cemetery. 70 The recipient of an Un-
desirable Discharge may receive numerous other veterans' benefits, such as
pensions for disabilities,71 vocational rehabilitation, 72 loans,73 special housing, 4
hospitalization,7 5 out-patient medical or dental treatment, 70 and compensation
for service-connected and non-service-connected death,7 7 if cleared by the
agency administering his benefit. His eligibility for seeing-eye dogs and mechan-
62. Petitioner had admitted to sodomous acts as a passive partner with a female
prostitute. The appellate procedure in this case involved reviews by a field board, Enlisted
Performance Evaluation Board, Chief of Naval Personnel, Navy Discharge Review Board
and Board for Correction of Naval Records. The Court of Claims affirmed the validity of
his General Discharge. Id.
63. See notes 35 & 36 supra. See also note 34 supra.
64. See, e.g., Dougherty & Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 33
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 498 (1964).
65. 162 Ct. CI. at 609.
66. Bednar at 12.
67. Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 853 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
68. Post separation difficulties are recognized by the military. See note 36 supra.
69. 37 U.S.C. §§ 501(a) (1) (A)-(B) (1964).
70. 24 U.S.C. § 281(a) (1) (1964). He is also ineligible for a headstone marker. 24 U.S.C.
§ 279(a) (1964).
71. Bednar at 37-38. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 301, 501 et. seq. (1964).
72. Bednar at 38. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1501 et. seq. (1964).
73. Bednar at 38. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1801 et. seq. (1964).
74. Bednar at 39. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq. (1964).
75. Bednar at 39. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 601 et. seq. (1964).
76. Bednar at 40.
77. Id. at 41. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1964). He is also eligible subject
to review for domiciliary care, Bednar at 39; prosthetic appliances, id. at 40; and burial
expenses, id. at 41.
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ical electronic equipment,7 8 and for automobiles70 depends upon his entitlement
to disability compensation. In general holders of Honorable or General Dis-
charges are entitled to all of the above benefits, if needed; holders of Bad
Conduct or Dishonorable Discharges are entitled to none of them.80
V. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE HoMosExuAL IN THE MILITARY
AND SUGGESTED METHODS OF SEPARATION
It is generally agreed that in civilian life most homosexuals are able to
assimilate themselves and circumvent the predominantly anti-homosexual atti-
tudes.8 1 Even before induction into the services, however, the homosexual is
forced to choose between concealing his tendencies, if possible, or revealing
them.8
2
It is much more difficult for the homosexual to maintain his dual identity
while in the armed services, which assume total control, especially of enlisted
men.s3 The concept that the greater isolation of military living and working
conditions contributes to a higher incidence of homosexuality than that found
in civilian life has been questioned,8 4 but is generally accepted.8, Many homo-
sexuals who were adjusted to civilian life "broke down either immediately after
induction or after they had tried without success to cope with their problems
in what was a demanding and unsympathetic environment."8 0 Studies reveal
that the homosexual fears bodily harm, is constantly tempted, and faces the
pressure of immediate discharge, perhaps without honor, if exposed.&7 The
service records reveal, however, that "homosexuality per se has no relationship
to ability to perform good military service."88 Indeed, many, concealing their
78. Bednar at 40. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 614 (1964).
79. Bednar at 41. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1901 (1964).
80. Bednar at 34-42. For a complete list of post-separation benefits in relation to type of
discharge, see Hearings on S. 3096 Before the Senate Armed Services Comm, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 28-29 (1954). See also Lemer, Effect of Character of Discharge and Length of Service
on Eligibility to Veterans' Benefits, 13 Military L. Rev. 121 (1961).
81. 2 E. Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier: Breakdown and Recovery 11, 12 (1959).
82. "The last of 70 items on the medical-history form prospective draftees must fill
out when they report for physicals reads, 'Have you ever had or have you now . . . homo-
sexual tendencies?' If a homosexual checks the 'no' box, he violates a federal law and risks
fine and imprisonment. If he checks 'yes,' he is disqualified. . . [Hlomosexuals are in-
eligible for 2.5 million federal jobs under Civil Service." Sanford, Boxed In, New Republic,
May 21, 1966, at 8. The federal sanction for falsely completing the medical-history farm is
a fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both. 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
83. 2 E. Ginzberg, supra note 81, at 11-12.
84. West & Glass at 251.
85. 3 E. Ginzberg, The Ineffective Soldier: Patterns of Performance 42 (19S9).
86. Id.
87. 2 E. Ginzberg, supra note 81, at 232.
88. Everhard at 20.
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homosexuality, served commendably.8 9 Once the homosexual was separated
from service he often was able to adjust again to civilian life.90
The Army through World War II maintained the strict policy of prompt
separation in almost every case regardless of the service record of the indi-
vidual.91 "The Army would not expose normal men to possible seduction by
homosexuals, especially since the latter might be in a position to take advantage
of rank." 92 Organizational difficulties and a sensitivity to public intolerance
of the homosexual made him "a distracting, disturbing element in an organiza-
tion where distractions and disturbances can have no place at the risk of the loss
of discipline." 93 Assuming that prompt separation is required in cases of con-
firmed homosexuality," by what means should the termination from service
be effected?
There seems to be little argument with the current treatment of Class I cases.
The Class is well defined and the proscribed actions certainly constitute legiti-
mate cause for courts-martial and Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges.
In Class II cases, however, the benefit to the services in providing for an
Undesirable Discharge, a "punitive" discharge, is more difficult to justify.05 It
may be argued that the homosexual has contributed to his situation through
falsely stating that he did not have such tendencies when he was inducted. 0 It
is reasonable to assume, however, that an individual who had adapted himself in
civilian life could believe, however incorrectly, that he could adapt as well in
the military.97 Furthermore, such falsehood, where intentional, itself constitutes
a federal crime9s involving adequate sanctions without recourse to a punitive
discharge.
Essentially, the Class II definition proscribes consensual sodomy. The same
arguments against punishment of this act in civilian life can be applied to its
commission while under military jurisdiction. 9 In general the civilian argu-
ments for outlawing such acts stress the right of society to protect itself against
the homosexual. 100 Homosexuals are so "nervous, secretive, and undepend-
89. 2 E. Ginzberg, supra note 81, at 232. See generally I. Bieber, Homosexuality 255-76
(1962) ("latent" homosexuals); M. Guttmacher & H. Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law
112-13 (1952); K. Menninger, The Human Mind 286 (3d ed. 1946) (overcompensation by
homosexuals).
90. 2 E. Ginzberg, supra note 81, at 11-12. As to "normal post-separation adjustment"
compare case histories id. at 246-48 & 117-19, with id. at 60-63.
91. Id. at 103-04.
92. Id. at 112.
93. Everhard at 20. "They are, in short, military liabilities and must be discharged." Id.
94. Cures are not a service responsibility and the prognosis is almost always poor. Ever-
hard at 20. See note 23 supra.
95. West and Glass at 271.
96. See note 82 supra.
97. See text accompanying notes 92-94 supra.
98. See note 82 supra.
99. See, e.g., Sadoff, Sexually Deviated Offenders, 40 Temp. L.Q. 305, 315 (1967); Com-
ment, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for Change, 13 S.D.L. Rev. 384, 395-97 (1968).
100. Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Yale L.. 986, 989 (1966).
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able" 101 that their usefulness to society is lost.10 2 Proponents 03 of anti-homo-
sexual legislation have also contended that such behavior menaces the health
of society and has a deleterious effect on family life, and that the consensual
offenders, if not punished, would eventually turn to molestation of minors.
Repeal of existing statutes, they have argued, would suggest toleration by the
state and result in a license to commit the condemned acts.
These arguments justifying such legislation of morality have been rebutted by
arguments stressing the mental illness usually related to the commission of
homosexual acts.10 4 To repeal the statutes, it is contended, would not give social
or moral approval to the acts but would merely reflect the understanding that
legislation cannot affect the tendencies of homosexuals.10 5 Moreover the laws
may be used to blackmail or coerce the offender.' 00 The rationality of the latter
approach is supported by the weight of current authority,10 7 and seems to be the
more logical treatment.
Another correlation with civilian treatment accorded the homosexual may be
made in considering the developing law of the status offender. Constitutional
objections to the indefinite confinement of sexual psychopaths have not met
with much success.10 8 Such statutes are generally found to be civil in nature
and thus the periods of confinement are not subject to the eighth amendment
ban on cruel and unusual punishments.' 0 9 Punitive confinement of a status
offender, however, has been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds.
In Robinson v. California'" a statute making it a misdemeanor for a person
"to be addicted to the use of narcotics" was found to effect cruel and unusual
punishment."' Punishment for the status must of course be distinguished from
punishment for the commission of an overt act necessarily related to that
status. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, for example, wrongful,
conscious possession of narcotics is a court-martial offense.112
101. Cantor, Deviation and the Criminal Law, 55 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 441, 450 (1964).
102. Id.
103. The arguments most often advanced by proponents of such legislation are collected
in id. at 449-52.
104. Comment, supra note 99, at 395. See also Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior:
The Desirability of Legislative Proscription, 30 Albany L. Rev. 291 (1966).
105. Comment, supra note 99, at 397.
106. "Statutory reform would at least eliminate the state from partnerships in blackmail.'
Id. at 396.
107. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution, Cmd.
No. 247 (1957) (The Wolfenden Report).
108. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
109. In re Kemmerer, 309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W.2d 652 (1944), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
767 (1946).
110. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
111. Id. at 666. But see, e.g., People v. Nettles, 34 IlL 2d 52, 213 NE.2d 536 (1966),
holding that Robinson did not bar prosecution for possession of narcotics.
112. See UCMIJ, arts. 92, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 892, 934 (1954). See also Stubbs, Narcotic
Offenses, JAG J., June 1956, at 7-8.
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The Class II homosexual in the military has presumably committed an
overt act, so the "punishment" meted out through the type of discharge given
would not contravene the eighth amendment. This distinction between the
status and the overt act has been criticized as one "more important to law than
medicine and one which conveniently ignores causative factors of homosexu-
ality .... ",113
Viewed in the context of the historical development of the military regula-
tions affecting homosexuals, current treatment is harsh. "Perhaps the punitive
discharge satisfies the general hostility and prejudice against homosexuality.1114
Retention in service, which was provided for in some cases during the relatively
lenient period immediately following World War 11,115 would not appear to have
been a desirable solution in Class II cases, since the military atmosphere is so
conducive to a recurrence of the incident prompting separation.110 An analogy
to retention in service may be drawn to the imprisonment of the civilian homo-
sexual." 7 Since fast separation is a valid military objective in these cases, the
form of discharge which most speedily effects separation should be adopted.
Despite current practice, use of the Undesirable Discharge often delays physical
separation because the accused individual, aware of the severe consequences
attending such a discharge, may appeal through procedures which may keep
him in uniform for more than a year. 18 Such practical considerations, as well
as consideration of the absurdity of punishing an individual for what is likely
to be but a symptom of his mental illness, suggest that the Honorable or General
Discharge mandate should be extended to Class II cases.
In Class III cases even the relatively mild censure of the General Discharge
seems harsh on the individual who has only confessed to the possibility of a
future violation. The separation policy of the military is frustrated so long as
the Class III individual attempts to hide his inclinations because of fear of a
less than Honorable Discharge. The Honorable Discharge should be mandated
in Class III cases.
The foregoing discussion raises some of the problems and inequities in the
military treatment of the homosexual. At the least a re-evaluation of military
objectives, attitudes, and procedures is needed in this area, with the result,
hopefully, of a more rational approach in the future.
113. Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333, 337 (W.D.N.C. 1964). Compare
Perkins, supra, with State v. Stubbs, 266 N.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d 899 (1966).
114. West & Glass at 272. See H. Weihofen, The Urge to Punish 28 (1956), a discussion
of the unconscious motivation at work on those who punish the sex offender.
115. See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
116. See text accompanying notes 83-86 supra.
117. "Putting [a homosexual] into the North Carolina prison system is a little like
throwing Brer Rabbit into the briarpatch." Perkins v. North Carolina, 234 F. Supp. 333,
339 (W.D.N.C. 1964) (footnote omitted).
118. See Comm. on the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Good Order and Discipline
in the Army, Report to Honorable Wilbur M. Brucker 286-87 (1960).
